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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  During the Great Recession, 36 
states exhausted their unemployment 
insurance (UI) reserves and had to 
borrow to pay benefits.
n  At the end of 2010, the UI system 
had accumulated $40.2 billion in 
debt, but by the end of 2018 had 
recovered to hold over $66 billion in 
reserves.
n  Year-end 2018 UI reserves were 
about 1 percent of total U.S. wages, 
but this share was 1.9 percent and 
1.5 percent before the 1991 and 2001 
recessions, and several states still 
needed to borrow.
n  If a severe recession started now, it 
would leave 21 states with combined 
debt of more than $21 billion; a mild 
recession would still leave 11 states 
with UI debt.
n  Ten of the states forced to borrow 
in the Great Recession have since cut 
benefit generosity; two of these would 
still need to borrow for an average 
recession.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/321/.
To pay unemployment insurance (UI) benefts to workers who lose their jobs, U.S. 
states hold reserves in accounts at the U.S. Treasury. When recessions hit, and many 
workers get laid of, these reserves can be depleted quickly. Te Great Recession, for 
example, exhausted the majority of UI reserve accounts, and not all states have yet 
adequately replenished them, even more than a decade later. What would happen to 
balances if another recession were to hit? 
To fnd out, we draw on the patterns of state beneft payments and tax receipts 
observed over the past 45 years to simulate UI reserve adequacy under the hypothetical 
case of a mild, moderate, or severe recession emerging in the coming months. Our 
results suggest that a recession as severe as the average of those occurring since 1974 
would cause 18 states to exhaust UI reserves and be forced to borrow to pay regular UI 
benefts. Notably, our simulations account for the fact that several states have cut beneft 
generosity since the Great Recession. 
Despite federal incentives for forward funding of benefts, the simulations show that 
UI fnancing is insufcient in many states. Although state beneft provisions are not 
excessive by historical standards, state-imposed constraints on the fnancing system 
make it slow to recover from debt. Furthermore, state cuts in beneft generosity weaken 
the automatic countercyclical efects of UI in the afermath of recessions, possibly 
slowing future state economic recoveries. Tese patterns indicate that the UI system 
is less capable of meeting its intended purpose of partially replacing lost income for 
unemployed workers between jobs. 
Financing UI Benefts: Adequate Reserves Are Key 
Unemployment insurance benefts are fnanced by taxes that employers pay on part of 
the payroll of their employees. Te portion of this payroll, called the taxable wage base, 
varies widely across states, and it can indicate state attitudes toward funding UI benefts. 
For example, the 2019 UI taxable wage base for each employee is $52,700 in Washington 
State but only $7,000 in Arizona, California, Florida, and Tennessee. Tis latter amount 
of $7,000 represents the minimum set by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
in 1983, and many states have not raised their taxable wage bases in more than 35 years. 
Twenty-nine states still have taxable wage bases at or below $15,000. Tese low wage 
bases, which have not kept up with wage increases over past decades, threaten funding 
for UI benefts. Indeed, Vroman (2011) found that among the 16 states that had indexed 
their wage bases to rise with infation, only 6 had to borrow from the federal government 
during the Great Recession; for the 35 states that did not index, 29 needed to borrow. 
Having a higher wage base allows greater accumulation of reserves—a rainy day 
account—so that when unemployment rises, states do not immediately have to raise 
taxes to pay benefts. Raising taxes is to be avoided if at all possible, because doing so 
causes employers to reduce hiring and increase layofs—the exact opposite of what is 
needed. A good rule of thumb is that reserve balances should be sufcient to pay at least 
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Despite federal incentives 
for adequate funding of 
benefts, our simulations 
show that UI fnances 
remain insufcient in 
many states. 
one year of benefts at levels comparable to a state’s highest annual spending over the 
past 20 years, called the average high-cost rate, or AHCR. To incentivize this minimum, 
states that meet it qualify for interest-free short-term loans from the U.S. Treasury should 
borrowing be needed to pay benefts. Nonetheless, at the end of 2018, 24 states still fell 
below the threshold. Figure 1 summarizes states’ 2018 year-end AHCR values, with lower 
values indicating smaller balances relative to average high-cost spending. 
Figure 1  At the End of 2018, Many States Lacked UI Reserves Sufcient to Cover a 
Year of Benefts after a Recession 
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SOURCE: USDOL (2019). 
Simulating UI Reserve Adequacy after Recessions 
When the next recession hits, will states’ UI reserves—collectively $66 billion at the 
end of 2018—be sufcient to pay benefts without having to borrow? We defne a state’s 
“reserve ratio” as its end-year UI trust fund balance, net of outstanding U.S. Treasury or 
bond debt, as a percentage of UI-taxable wages that year. Using annual data from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, we examine how this ratio changed over each of the fve recessions 
since 1974. Te 1991−92 and 2001−02 recessions were mild in terms of UI benefts paid, 
while the recessions of 1974−75, 1980−82, and 2008−09 were severe. Based on how 
reserve ratios changed across these types of recessions, as well as an average of the mild 
and severe, we simulate how reserves could change from their year-end 2018 values 
during the next recession. As shown in Figure 2, our simulations suggest the following: 
1) A severe recession would leave state reserves collectively in the red by nearly $3.8 
billion, and 21 states would incur debt to the U.S. Treasury of $30.9 billion. 
2) An average recession would leave 18 states short of reserves by an estimated $15.3 
billion. 
3) A mild recession would reduce collective reserves by over $40 billion, with $25.6 
billion lef, but 11 states would still need to borrow a total of $8.8 billion to pay 
UI benefts. 
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reserves—a rainy day 
account—so that when 
unemployment rises, 
states do not immediately 
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benefts. 
Why Are So Many State Reserves Still So Low and at Risk of Insufciency? 
During and afer the Great Recession, the 53 state UI programs (including 
Washington, D.C.’s, Puerto Rico’s, and the Virgin Islands’) varied in how they tried to 
rebuild their reserves. Some undertook extensive reforms, many let their programs 
automatically recover under existing laws, and nearly half paid federal penalties to 
replenish their UI funds. 
Sixteen states actively improved their UI fnancing systems by increasing their taxable 
wage bases or lowering reserve thresholds that automatically trigger tax rate increases, 
with 4 of these states also cutting beneft generosity. Tese 16 states are spread across the 
country and have diverse industrial mixes, and their actions suggest an appreciation for 
the UI system in contributing to the viability and strength of their state workforces. 
Other states have been less proactive. Seventeen states maintained the status quo 
and simply let their UI fnancing systems gradually recover. States in this group tend to 
have above-average reserve ratios, and their UI systems tend to be resilient fnancially. 
Tey typically pay higher-than-average UI benefts, but they also are more likely to have 
higher tax bases that automatically adjust for payroll growth and tax rates that adjust to 
maintain UI reserves. 
Another 25 states let their UI debt to the U.S Treasury accumulate. Consequently, 
these states have had to pay penalty taxes through higher tax rates on workers’ wages 
until the debt is paid of. Tis passive response of allowing higher federal UI taxes is a 
poor long-term fnancial strategy, however, because of a clif efect: once the debt is paid 
of, the tax rate falls abruptly, and so reserves will start at zero and rebuild only slowly, 
setting up the system for a repeat failure. 
A few other states—6 of them—took active steps that undercut their UI fnances. 
Tese states had laws that automatically increased UI tax rates on employers when 
reserves fell sufciently low, but state ofcials overrode these laws. Presumably they did 
so to shield businesses from rate increases and accommodate business growth early in 
Figure 2  The Next Recession Would Leave Between 11 And 21 States With Negative 
UI Fund Reserves, Depending On Its Severity 
NOTE: Figure represents results from authors’ simulations of UI fund balances across states following 
recessions of indicated severity, assuming state balances started at year-end 2018 levels. Created with 
mapchart.net.© 
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Several reforms could 
strengthen the system, 
including increasing 
the taxable wage base, 
higher interest rates on 
state reserves, and lower 
borrowing costs for crisis 
loans to states. 
the economic recovery, but the decision delayed rebuilding reserves, and 4 of the 6 states 
still have reserves below the recommended multiple of 1.0 (see Figure 1). 
Eight states issued bonds to pay either UI benefts or U.S. Treasury debt. Although 
bond rates were low in this period, issuing bonds can be a risky strategy when interest 
rates are volatile, and it shifs employer debt to a general obligation of the state (and the 
taxpayer). Additionally, a few other states cut beneft durations to reduce future beneft 
needs. However, several of the states issuing bonds or cutting beneft durations still have 
low reserves, and our simulations suggest their UI fnancing is still shaky. 
Conclusion 
Te federal-state UI system exists to provide partial temporary income replacement 
to involuntarily unemployed workers as they seek reemployment. Te system also plays 
an important macroeconomic role, as this income replacement helps automatically boost 
spending during business downturns and moderate it during expansions. Adequate 
funding of benefts reinforces this countercyclical role, but emerging diferences in UI 
fnancing among states may hamper its efectiveness (O’Leary and Wandner 2018). 
Several reforms could strengthen the system, including increasing (and indexing to 
infation) the taxable wage base, paying higher interest rates on state reserves held at the 
U.S. Treasury, and reducing borrowing costs for crisis loans to states from the federal 
government—with rates at or below prevailing municipal bond rates. Without these 
reforms, many states are likely to experience reserve defciencies in the next recession. 
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